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Individual differences and applicant faking behavior: One of these applicants is not like the other

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Abstract

The increased use of personality measures in selection settings has brought attention to concerns about applicant faking (Douglas, McDaniel & Snell, 1996). The current study examined several factors that have been suggested by theoretical models to contribute to applicant faking. Our research suggests that external factors, such as situational variance, as well as internal factors including integrity and locus of control are related to applicant faking behavior. Several variables that have traditionally been associated with faking behavior, such as ability, SDE and IM, did not demonstrate predictive relationships.

Although personality-based selection measures have become increasingly popular, a major concern in applied personnel selection settings is that applicants may distort their responses (Hough & Oswald, 2000; McFarland & Ryan, 2000). While some debate still surrounds the issue, research strongly suggests that at least some applicants fake non-cognitive personnel selection tools (Barrick & Mount, 1996, Schmit & Ryan, 1993; Stokes, Hogan, & Snell, 1993; Wheeler, Hamill & Tippins, 1996). When motivated to make a good impression, applicants are likely to convey an image that inflates desirable qualities and exhibits attributes of an ideal employee (Rosse, Stecher, Miller, and Levin, 1998).

The faking of personality measures has been referred to in the literature as response distortion, impression management, social desirability, displaying unlikely virtues, and self enhancement (Hough, Eaton, Dunnette, Kamp & McCloy, 1990; Hough & Paullin, 1994; Ones, Viswesvaran, & Korbin, 1995). This lack of clear terminology and operational definition of the phenomenon has slowed research efforts and often led researchers to inconclusive or misleading results. While there is a general consensus that individuals can fake (Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999), and that some applicants do fake in employment settings (Griffith, Chmielowski, Snell, Frei, McDaniel, & Yoshita, 2000), researchers have yet to uncover the dynamics and consequences of faking behavior, partially because the operational definition of the faking has been deficient.

More comprehensive models of applicant faking behavior have been suggested by McFarland and Ryan (2000), and Snell and McDaniel (1998). These models recognize the dynamic nature of the phenomenon, and incorporate a variety of possible influences on applicant faking. These models include factors internal to the faker (ability, values,

knowledge of the construct), as well as external influences (scale characteristics, warnings, desirability of the job). While these models offer the most complete explanation of applicant faking behavior, they have not been empirically tested.

One of the most elusive elements of the faking model is its effect on the prediction of job performance. While not always explicitly stated, previous research has suggested an implicit assumption that applicant faking is volitional. Even when the “unconscious” elements of faking behavior, such as self deceptive enhancement (SDE), are mentioned, they are not the primary focus. This focus on the internal characteristics of the individual is consistent with fundamental attribution theory, in which behaviors tend to be associated with individual characteristics instead of the situation. This categorization of faking behavior is more prone to be associated with a lack of integrity (and therefore subsequent poor subsequent job performance).

However, as theoretical models (McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Snell & McDaniel, 1998) have suggested, many factors may contribute to the elevation of applicant scores. Some of these factors are internal to the applicant, but others may be a function of the situation. Most likely the deciding factor of whether an applicant will elevate their score in an applicant setting will be an interaction of the situation and applicant characteristics.

While faking may be an individual behavior (Snell & McDaniel, 1998; Zickar & Robie, 1999), the influence of situational variance cannot be ignored. The situation of applying for a job is highly constrained. We are socialized to put our “best foot forward” and to emphasize our strengths during employment seeking behavior. Applicants may not be “faking” in the sense that they are dishonest, but may be answering in a fashion that they perceive to be consistent with the demands of the situation. This situational

influence may be particularly strong for the trait of conscientiousness, the construct most frequently cited as a predictor of job performance. Recent research suggests that conscientiousness is one of the least consistent traits of the “Big Five” personality taxonomy (English, 2004).

Other potential sources of faking variance are cognitive biases. Common examples of cognitive biases that can influence responses to non-cognitive instruments are nay saying (the tendency to respond negatively to an inquiry) and acquiescence (the tendency to answer in the affirmative). Additional sources of cognitive bias may also influence faking behavior. One such bias is Locus of Control (Cohen, Swerdlick, & Smith, 1992), which influences whether individuals see themselves in control of factors affecting their lives, or attribute control to outside forces such as luck. One cognitive bias that has received little attention in the response distortion literature is temporal bias. Previous research has demonstrated a tendency for well-adjusted individuals to see the future as being better than the past. Thus, answering questions about future job performance, applicants may not be overtly dishonest, but simply manifesting a “hard-wired” tendency to predict optimistic estimates future performance. This phenomenon may explain differences found between applicant and incumbent scores on personality inventories (Stokes, Hogan, & Snell, 1993). While the situation may dictate a future frame of reference for applicants that may inflate scores, incumbents may adopt a present frame of reference

Another individual characteristic that has been hypothesized to contribute to applicant faking behavior is ability. Previous research has suggested that applicants must identify what construct is being measured, and choose the response that portrays that

response in a positive light for the specific job that the applicant is attempting to obtain (Douglas, McDaniel & Snell, 1998; McFarland & Ryan 2000). Overall, when instructed to fake-good individuals are able to raise their predictor scores nearly .5 standard deviations (Ones, et al., 1995). While this estimate provides an indication of group level differences it does not account for the individual variance in the ability to fake. There are likely to be more individual variation on ability to fake under non-instructional set conditions, and previous research has provided empirical evidence that when some applicants attempt to fake, their attempts are unsuccessful, and they actually lower their scores (Griffith et al., 2000).

Non-cognitive traits have also been examined as possible determinants of faking behavior. Previously investigated characteristics include variables such as morals, honesty/integrity, and self-monitoring. Models of applicant faking have suggested that these characteristics may interact with ability to produce elevated scores in an applicant setting. While an applicant may have the ability to fake, the level of these non-cognitive traits may determine the amount of faking that actually occurs.

Any examination of applicant faking and individual differences would be deficient if it did not include the construct of Socially Desirable Responding (SDR). SDR has been a strong focus of the investigation of applicant faking behavior, and often has been considered synonymous with faking (Ones et al., 1996). SDR has been split into two independent factors, Self-Deceptive Enhancement (SDE), and Impression Management (IM). SDE has been characterized as an unconscious inflation of existing traits (Paulhus, 1984), while IM is characterized by intentional deception, and thus has been the focus of much research focusing on performance. These constructs have been

used as “flags” for faking, statistical controls, and potential relevant sources of job performance (Ones et al. 1996), but alone have not adequately unraveled applicant faking behavior.

The variables impacting faking may be present in different amounts in unique situations, and individual job applicants. Applicants may have similar elevated scores on personality measures; however, that elevation may have been caused by different factors. Faking behavior is dynamic and may demonstrate considerable individual differences in the amount individuals “fake”, and why their applicant scores elevate. An applicant that “fakes” because they are sensitive to situation cues may have a very different set of characteristics than an applicant who fakes due to a lack of integrity. Rather than seeing fakers as good performers or bad performers, we would expect to see some variance in job performance because of these differences (some of these factors may be associated with poor performance, while others may not).

This study seeks to build on these proposed models by examining the phenomenon applicant faking as an interaction of situational variance, cognitive biases, ability, and, integrity. In addition we will test the influence of previously suggested faking related constructs such as self-deceptive enhancement and impression management. We tested these factors in a new framework which allowed for the direct assessment of applicant faking, rather than inferring this faking indirectly. The paper first outlines the literature regarding the factors impacting faking and proposes a set of research hypotheses. Next, the methodology used to test those hypotheses will be presented. The analyses and subsequent results will be discussed, and finally, limitations and directions for future research will be suggested.

### Applicant Faking Behavior

Although personality measures are widely accepted in organizational settings, there are some disadvantages to their use. The largest disadvantage of these measures is that the accuracy of the data collected is completely dependent on the willingness of the respondent to give accurate information. However, in organizational settings it is often not in the best interest of the respondent to answer honestly. Respondents may have considerable motivation to fake when these instruments are used to make decisions that have substantial impact on them. It is generally accepted that respondents completing personality measures can fake in both good and bad directions (Dalen, Stanten, & Roberts, 2001). However, in an I/O setting generally, applicants fake their responses in a positive direction to appear more desirable to their perspective employer (Stokes et al., 1993). While conceptually simple, in practice it has been extremely difficult to directly identify which individual or group of individuals faked their responses in an employment context. Because of this difficulty researchers have been left to study proxy variables, simulated responses, and confounded indicators such as social desirability, faking instructional sets, and applicant scores. To directly assess applicant faking we suggest an alternative framework.

Latent trait theory suggests that an individual's behaviors are influenced by constructs, and that individual differences on these constructs can be accurately measured. Central to this theory is the notion of the true score. A true score is the individual's actual level of the construct, but this level cannot be directly measured and must be inferred. To determine the level of an individual's true score on a construct, we

repeatedly measure the target trait, theoretically an infinite number of times, and take the mean of this distribution of scores. In an applicant setting, individuals may answer non-cognitive measures in a fashion that does not reflect this true score in order to increase their chances of being hired. Thus, the difference between the individual's true score and the score in the applicant setting is an appropriate measure of faking (Figure 1.).

While conceptually uncomplicated, the conditions necessary for this definition of faking cannot be fully met. The true score is a theoretical abstraction, and direct measurement of a true score is not possible. Because true scores can never be known, measurement researchers have traditionally relied on alternative methods to derive the true score. Classical test theory offers an operational definition of true score, and a method to estimate this score. Multiple observations, either through repeated measurement of the construct, or in the weaker form of multiple items, are averaged to produce an estimate of the true score. Because of the imprecise nature of this estimate, the standard error of measurement is used to form a confidence interval around the mean score, and the true score is assumed to reside within this interval.

These measurements are taken over a variety of situations, and the mean of the distribution of scores is defined as the overall true score. There are two concerns with this approach to estimating the true score in regards to examining applicant faking. The first obvious concern is pragmatic; an infinite (or even many) number of observations is not practical and is likely to result in random responding. The second issue regards the collection of measurements across situations and then averaging those observations. For the examination of the faking issue *the situation, and its impact on personality measures*, is the variable of interest. Therefore, collapsing across different settings removes

relevant situation driven variance that may be central to the faking question. While identifying the true score is necessary to determine the amount of applicant faking using our definition, it may be possible to estimate faking using an approximation of the true score that can serve as a baseline.

Individuals must be assessed under two types of conditions in order to definitively identify applicant faking behavior. First, they must complete the non-cognitive measure while applying for a real job. Under this condition respondents are under the impression that scores on the personality measure are taken into account, and may be intrinsically motivated to represent themselves in a favorable light. Second, individuals must be directed to honestly fill out a personality measure under pure research conditions to provide a baseline for our operational definition of faking. Here, respondents are not exposed to any incentives and are therefore not motivated to fake. This honest score can serve as a baseline score which approximates the true score. Additional faking relevant data can be gathered if participants are asked to fake the personality measure to represent a highly favorable picture of themselves. This data would be useful to examine the ability for respondents to fake rather than as opposed to the propensity to fake.

On a group level, the average scores of these three conditions should differ from each other. Significant average score differences between certain conditions are projected to exist, such that honest scores will be the lowest, followed by elevated applicant scores, and finally the fake good condition will have the highest mean score.

Therefore, faking can be operationally defined in two ways by taking the difference between response conditions. First, faking may be operationally defined by taking the difference between the applicant score and the honest score. This difference

score is referred to as the actual *amount* that individuals fake personality measures when applying for a job. Second, faking may be operationalized by calculating the difference between the fake good score and the honest score, which reveals the pure *ability* of an individual to fake if instructed to do so. Thus, the actual *amount* that an individual is faking in an applicant setting is a different phenomenon and conceptually distinct from the pure ability to fake.

### Influences on Applicant Faking Behavior

#### *Situational Variance*

Interactional psychology accepts the notion that situations cause different people to behave similarly and similar people to behave differently. This principal is comprised of three basic assumptions (Tett & Gutterman, 2000). The first is that these situational influences on behavior are mediated by how situations are perceived (Mischel, 1973). The second is that people influence and are influenced by their environment. Third, in order for personality traits to be expressed, trait-relevant situations are required (Kenrick & Funder, 1988). Lord (1982) found that the best predictors of consistency were tailored to each individual's unique perceptions. In other words, our perceptions of a situation will drive our behavior in that specific situation.

One situational constraint that researchers in the field of Industrial/Organizational Psychology are concerned with is the applicant situation. It may not always be that applicants are faking (responding dishonestly), but that they are responding in a manner dictated by the situation. The situation may be driving their responses more than their true score on the trait in question. In this case the situation (employment setting) strongly influences the responses and a common pattern (inflated true scores) may be identified.

This pattern of responses may be unconscious (and not necessarily dishonest responding), and personality traits of a least consistent nature may be more impacted by these situational drives.

Many researchers have focused on this phenomenon, but under various titles. These titles include cross-situational consistency (CSC), trait activation, and frame of reference (FOR). Douglas and Paunonen (1985) stress the importance of situational relevance when assessing personality. An existing trait may not be recorded due to an irrelevant circumstance. They suggest that situational relevance must be considered when developing a personality measurement instrument, or experiment. Many researchers have focused on this phenomenon, but under various titles, including cross-situational consistency (CSC), trait activation, and frame of reference (FOR).

Tett and Gutterman (2000) offer support for the notion of situational effects on behavior. In their own words, the behavioral expression of a trait depends on the arousal of that trait, by what they refer to as trait-related situational cues. In a more recent review of contextual specificity, Mischel and Shoda (1995) suggested that a trait that is dependent, or “activated”, by a particular situation should be measured only under that specific situation. Our study utilizes FOR to tease out the effects of situational variance, by examining the applicant faking on two measures, one developed in a general frame of reference, and one using a work FOR.

### Cognitive Biases

#### *Temporal Context*

While scores on a personality scale are seen to reflect an individual’s general level on a trait, external influences may change the way a persons frames the perception

of their level on a trait. For example, research has found significant mean level differences on a measure of the big five when it is asked in a general frame of reference and a work context frame of reference (Costa, 1996; Schmidt & Ryan, 1995). Similarly, previous research has suggested that a temporal frame of reference (whether an individual is answering in a past, present, or future context) may have a similar impact (Robinson & Ryff, 1999; Wilson, & Ross, 2000; Wilson, & Ross, 2001).

Wilson and Ross (2001) conducted a series of studies that showed that people tend to describe their past selves less favorably than their present selves, and that enhancement in the perception of the present self can be illusory, i.e. in the absence of actual improvement. Positive personality traits, similar to the affective states studied in Robinson and Ryff (1999), are desirable attributes and individuals may wish to demonstrate them in the appropriate context. Further, people tend to perceive more control over their future than their past, and hence would be more prone to have more positive estimates of their future selves in comparison to their past selves (Robinson & Ryff, 1999). This is a 'feel good' type of projection where anticipated improvements serve as conditions for inspiration and self-enhancement. Buehler, Griffin, and Ross (1994) focus on the point that people often tend to ignore reality in the face of negative past experiences in the same or similar process, and remain overly optimistic.

In the selection for employment setting, there may be less motivation to for accurate self-assessment and hence temporal comparisons would be prevalent. Applicants may also find a future state (which may be illusory) more appealing and desirable, and the individual anticipates the acquisition of this future state (Wilson & Ross, 2000).

Further, people tend to perceive more control over their future than their past (Robinson & Ryff, 1999).

### Ability

Research investigating whether cognitive ability influences the faking of personality measures is scarce and offers inconsistent findings. Garry (1953) found that the ability to fake vocational interests was not correlated with intelligence. However, the lack of significant findings may be due to a low motivation on behalf of participants to fake the Strong Vocational Interest Blank, since no incentives were offered. Anderson et al. (1984) also failed to find mean score differences in faking the Personal Orientation Inventory (POI), a self-report inventory purportedly measuring Maslow's concept of self-actualization, between high and low IQ undergraduate participants. Finally, Burkhart et al. (1978) did not find a significant relationship between intelligence scores and endorsement of subtle items (the degree to which the psychopathological meaning of an item can be determined in an a priori fashion) on the MMPI (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory). However, intelligent individuals were better at picking obvious pathological items when instructed to *fake bad*.

On the other hand, several studies have reported significant relationships between intelligence and the response distortion of non-cognitive measures. Alliger et al. (1996) investigated whether individuals high in cognitive ability are able to more successfully fake integrity tests. The authors suggested that intelligence and the ability to fake the overt integrity test were positively correlated ( $r = .36, p < .05$ ). Correlations between intelligence and the ability to fake the covert integrity measure were not significant.

Nguyen (2002) investigated the fakability of the Work Judgment Survey, a situational judgment test, using a within subjects design. Respondents' cognitive ability was found to predict faking behavior, accounting for 3% of the variance in faked judgment scores. However, honesty was found to moderate the cognitive ability-faking behavior relationship such that the above relationship was stronger with a lower level of honesty. Therefore, more intelligent individuals that highly value honesty tend to fake personality measures less than those who are not very honest.

Finally, Austin, Hofer, Deary, and Eber (2000) also found positive correlations for a police applicant sample between cognitive ability and the personality traits of stability, dominance, enthusiasm, extraversion, independence, and conscientiousness, which all represent highly desirable traits. However, negative correlations between cognitive ability and the personality traits of shrewdness and apprehensiveness, which are generally not considered to be highly desirable traits, were found. Unfortunately, Austin et al. (2000) failed to administer the non-cognitive measures to a control group (a group not motivated to fake their scores) in addition to applicants, so results are not interpretable. This pattern of empirical relationships may occur if applicants faked the personality measures in order to present a favorable picture hoping to gain employment.

### Integrity

Applicant integrity may also have a statistical relationship with applicant response distortion, with low integrity resulting in higher amounts of faking. Integrity is often considered synonymous with honesty, implying truthfulness, fairness, and refusal to engage in fraud or deceit. While an individual may have the ability to fake a selection measure, the applicant may choose not to do so because of high levels of integrity.

Douglas et al. (1996) suggested that an individuals' behavior is strongly influenced by their values. Individuals' moral or ethical values may be measured by integrity measures, which assess job commitment, moral reasoning, responsibility, and work ethics (Ones, Viswesvaran, & Schmidt, 1993). Conceivably, individuals with high integrity will have high moral standards therefore would not distort their response because doing so is wrong. Research has demonstrated that individuals with high integrity tend to be reserved, responsible, and moderate, while those with low integrity tend to be impulsive, spontaneous, and emotional (Sackett & Wanek, 1996). McFarland and Ryan (2000) examined the relationship between faking and integrity measures. They found that individuals with higher integrity scores were less likely to increase their scores through faking.

Research has shown that integrity tests are valid predictors of employee theft (Ones, Viswesvaran, & Schmidt, 1993; Sackett & Wanek, 1996; Shaffer & Schmidt, 1999). Criteria that integrity test scores have been shown to predict include: likelihood of getting caught stealing, supervisor ratings of employee's dishonesty, criminal history, and theft admissions. Other research has found that those applying to and working in high-theft stores have lower integrity scores than those applying to and working in low theft stores (Shaffer & Schmidt, 1999). However, in a report published by Congress of the United States Office of Technology Assessment (OTA, 1990) a review of integrity testing and integrity testing research concluded, "the research on integrity tests has not yet produced data that clearly supports or dismisses the assertion that these tests can predict dishonest behavior" (p. 8).

### Locus of Control

Locus of Control refers to the degree of control an individual feels that they have over life. Individuals with an internal locus of control (the belief that there are consequences associated with behavior and that individuals have control of what happens to them) may be less likely to distort their responses. Conversely, individuals with external locus of control (the belief that what happens to them is beyond their personal control) would be more susceptible to response distortion in an applicant setting. Trevino and Youngblood (1990) found that locus of control influenced ethical decision-making. Individuals with internal locus of control exhibited more ethical decisions ( $r = -0.42, p < 0.01$ ). In addition locus of control has been empirically linked to academic dishonesty (Leming, 1980). Coleman and Mahaffey (2000) found evidence that suggests that those individuals with internal locus of control are less tolerant of cheating than those with an external locus of control. The authors suggest that “people who believe the majority of their experiences are beyond their control are therefore more likely to gain some relief if they can assert some control over their outcome” (pg. 129). This relationship may be extended to response distortion in an applicant setting. Individuals who feel more responsible for their own action (internal) are less likely to exhibit unethical behavior (faking or response distortion to get what they want). Individuals with an external locus of control may fake as a way to cope with what they perceive as a lack of control over the selection process.

### Hypotheses

In order to tease out the effects of situational variance, we compared personality measures utilizing different frames-of-reference (FOR). In the general condition no FOR

was specified, and in the work condition measures were modified to reflect an employment setting. It was hypothesized that work frame-of-reference will decrease the applicant distortion believed to occur because of the ambiguity found in general personality measures.

Hypothesis 1:

There will be significant difference in the amount of applicant faking between general and work frame of reference conditions, such that there will be less faking in the FOR condition.

Hypothesis 2:

There will be significant difference in the number of applicants identified as fakers between the general and work frame of reference conditions, such that there will be less fakers in the FOR condition.

In this study, we adopted the past, present and future perception methodology of Robinson and Ryff (1999). This methodology was modified, by including past, present and future versions of the Summated Conscientiousness Scale (SCS), a personality measure designed to measure an applicant's level of conscientiousness. This methodology may help us to identify individuals that are prone to self-deception by looking at the differences between scores on the past and future versions of the SCS.

Hypothesis 3:

Respondents' mean score on the future version of the SCS will be significantly higher than respondents' mean score on the past version of the SCS.

Hypothesis 4:

Respondents' mean score on the future version of the SCS would be significantly higher than respondents' mean score on the present version of the SCS.

Individuals high in cognitive ability tend to recognize and solve problems, especially ambiguous problems, more successfully than those low in ability. Personality measures can be characterized as "ill-defined" (Vernon, 1933), and often have various acceptable solutions. Further, they are embedded in, and require prior everyday experience. Finally, they also require a certain amount of verbal ability in order to understand the underlying construct. High ability individuals may be better able to analytically apply problem solving strategies and verbal abilities by first detecting the underlying construct of an item, and figuring out the desirable answer. They might also understand the advantage of faking personality selection measures in order to obtain the job. Individual slow in cognitive ability may fail to do so, naively approaching the non-cognitive measure, failing to see which personality characteristics an employer might find to be desirable for his or her employees. The general condition, with little situational cues is more ill defined than the work FOR. Therefore, we expect there to be different effects across conditions such that cognitive ability would predict the amount of applicant faking in the general condition, but not in the work FOR.

Hypothesis 5a:

Cognitive ability will account for significant variance in the amount of faking (as measured by the difference between applicant scores and honest scores) in the general condition.

Hypothesis 5b:

Cognitive ability will not account for significant variance in the amount of faking (as measured by the difference between applicant scores and honest scores) in the work FOR condition.

According to McFarland and Ryan (2000), “research within social psychology has indicated that individuals who are inherently honest and have high moral standards are less likely to attempt to control the images they present to others because they believe that doing so is wrong” (p. 814). Therefore it is hypothesized that those with lower integrity levels will have a higher propensity to fake on a measure on the “big five” (NEO-FFI), than those with higher integrity levels. However we expect that FOR will partially moderate this relationship. In the general condition a large portion of the faking variance should be accounted for by the situation. With this variance reduced in the work FOR condition, integrity should account for a large portion of the variance in applicant faking.

Hypothesis 6:

Integrity will be significantly negatively correlated to the amount of applicant faking.

The research examining locus of control and ethical decision-making (Youngblood, 1990), academic dishonesty (Leming, 1980), and tolerance for cheating would suggest that individuals with external locus of control would also be more likely to fake in an applicant setting than those with internal locus control.

Hypothesis 7:

Locus of control will be significantly negatively correlated to the amount of applicant faking, such that those with external locus of control will be more likely to fake than those with an internal locus of control.

Hypothesis 8:

Impression Management (IM) will be significantly positively correlated to the amount of applicant faking.

Hypothesis 9:

Self Deceptive Enhancement (SDE) will be significantly positively correlated to the amount of applicant faking.



## Methodology

### Participant Sample

Data was initially collected from a total of 467 undergraduate students from several participating universities in the southeast. Participants were given extra-credit or research experience points for their participation. For the General-measure conditions, the mean age was 22.46 (Min=16, Max=47). 54.3% of the population was male, 43.4% female and 2.3% did not respond to the demographic items. 73.2% of those responding were currently employed and 26.8% were not employed. For the Work-measure conditions the mean age was 21.37 (Min=16, Max=55). 50.2% of the population was male, 47.8% female and 2.0% did not respond to the demographic items. 50.8% of those responding were currently employed, and 49.2% were not employed.

### Measures

#### *NEO-FFI "General" Version*

The NEO-FFI is a shorter and validated version of the NEO-PI-R that assesses global information on the Big Five personality traits (Costa & McCrae, 1992). This measure consists of a total of 60-item, with 12 items each assessing the personality traits of Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness. The 12-items with the strongest (positive or negative) loadings for each factor from the NEO-PI-R, comprise the NEO-FFI. Internal consistency for the NEO-FFI is .86, .77, .73, .68, and .81 for Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness respectively (Costa & McCrae, 1992).

*NEO-FFI “Work” FOR Version*

A revised version of the NEO-FFI will be used as the Work FOR measure of personality. Each item was re-phrased within a specific work context following the method of Schmit, Ryan, Stierwalt, and Powell (1995). For example, the Conscientiousness item that reads “I keep my belongings neat and clean.”, will be written as “At work, I keep my belongings neat and clean.”. Another example is the Agreeableness item that reads, “I try to be courteous to everyone I meet”, it will be rewritten to read “I try to be courteous to everyone I meet while working”. Seven items comprising the Openness scale were not rewritten because of their content. These items were “I am intrigued by the patterns I find in art and nature”, “Poetry has little or no effect on me”, “I often try new and foreign foods”, “Sometimes when I am reading poetry or looking at a work of art, I feel a chill or wave of excitement”, “I have little interest in speculating on the nature of the universe or the human condition,” and “I have a lot of intellectual curiosity”. Rewording these items in a work context would confuse a respondent. It was for this reason that Schmitt et al (1995) excluded the Openness scale from their analysis of FOR effects.

*Summated Conscientiousness Scale (SCS)*

This scale is a measure of conscientiousness and is composed of 20 items that are rated on a 7-point Likert scale. This measure has a previously demonstrated internal consistency reliability of  $\alpha = 0.84$ , and has correlation of  $r = .75$ ,  $p < .05$  with the NEO-PI R conscientiousness scale (Griffith, Chmielowski, Snell, Frei, McDaniel, & Yoshita, 2002). The work context version was used, which is one of the two versions available. An

example item is “I complete work projects from start to finish”. The SCS was also modified to develop two new versions based on the past and future temporal contexts.

### *Cognitive Ability*

The Wonderlic Personnel Test (WPT; Wonderlic, 2002) is a brief measure of cognitive ability widely used in pre-employment testing (Murphy, 1984). The WPT is a 50-item pencil and paper test requiring 12 minutes of administration time. The test includes word comparisons, disarranged sentences, sentence parallelism, direction following, number comparisons, number series, analysis of geometric figures, and story problems requiring either math or logic solutions. Total scores have been found to correlate with scores from other established tests of intelligence. For instance, it is highly correlated with the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale ( $r = .93$ ), the Stanford Achievement Test ( $r = .61$ ), and the General Aptitude Test Battery ( $r = .74$ ).

### *Integrity*

The Applicant Integrity Scale (AIS), developed by (Griffith, 1997) was used to assess individual integrity levels. The scale is comprised of nine items, and answers are recorded on a 5-point Likert scale (A=Always to E=Never). Griffith (1997) reported an internal consistency Alpha = .87 ( $M = 61.02$ ,  $SD = 8.5$ ). This scale was construct validated with an integrity scale developed by Ryan and Sackett (1987), and the honest scores on the NEO-FFI. Previous research has suggested that integrity is related to conscientiousness (Ones et al., 1993).

*Locus of Control.*

Locus of Control will be measured using the Work Locus of Control Scale (WLOC) developed by Spector (1988). The measure has coefficient alphas ranging from 0.75 to 0.85 and has been adapted to the work setting. It consists of 16 Likert scale items (A=Always to E=Never) that measure beliefs regarding personal control in the work settings (Spector, 1988).

*Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR)*

The BIDR-6 measures an individual's propensity to answer in a manner that is socially desirable when filling out self-reports. The instrument is comprised of 3 subscales: Self-Deceptive Enhancement (SDE), Impression Management (IM) and the Self-Deceptive Denial Sub-scale. The 20 items comprising each scale were rationally designed to distinguish between conscious and unconscious biases in self-reports. The internal consistency reliability of the Self-Deception scale ranges from .65 to .75, while the reliabilities for the Impression Management scale range from .75 to .80. With a 5-week interval test-retest reliabilities were .69 for the SDE scale and .77 for the IM scale. We used the BIDR-6 but with a 5-point Likert scale instead of the standard 7-point Likert scale. The Paulhus Deception Scales (PDS), formerly named the BIDR, use a 5-point Likert scale, and the reliability estimates are very similar to the 7-point version (Selekin, 2000).

### Procedure

Participants were informed before the experimenter's arrival that they would be participating in a scheduled research day. Participants received either extra-credit or research experience points towards their class grade. To replicate a true applicant condition, deception was used in this study. The experimenter portrayed himself as an employee for a local, university based consulting firm.

Participants were then told that while they were participating in research, they would also have the opportunity to apply for a student job at the consulting firm. Participants were given a job description and asked to read it carefully. This job description advertised the job as paying \$18.00/hour and offered flexible work hours and the ability to work from home or school. The job description presented the job as comprised of mostly clerical work and the experimenter ensured the participants that they were each eligible.

Following the description of the job, participants were given an applicant packet. The applicant packet was comprised of a job application, the Wonderlic Personnel Test, the SCS and the NEO-FFI. A total of 467 respondents participated in the study; however complete data was available for 356 participants. Of those 356 participants that completed this experiment, 178 participants received packets that contained General versions of the NEO-FFI, and 178 participants received a packet that contained the Work (FOR) version of the NEO-FFI.

The application asked participants if they were 1) interested in the job, and 2) and if they wished to apply for the job, to provide current employer contact information. Participants were debriefed and the experimenter told the participants that no job existed.

Participants were also told that any contact with their current employer would be for research purposes only, and no mention of their job application would be made.

The NEO-FFI was then administered under an additional instructional set, which directed participants to answer the items as honestly as possible. In the honest condition the BIDR, Locus of Control, and the Integrity measure were also administered. In addition 178 participants were asked to complete the three temporal versions of the SCS (past, present, and future)

## Results

### *Manipulation Check*

To ensure that the manipulation was successful a brief survey was randomly collected from a sub-sample of 64 participants. This survey asked “Did you believe that you were applying for a real job during this experiment?” Table I demonstrates that 75% of the participants believed they were applying for a real job.

The application also included an item to measure the manipulation’s effect. Participants were asked to rate their interest in the job on a 5-point scale where 1= no interest and 2 –5 = somewhat interested to very interested. In the General measure conditions, 79.9% of the participants rated their interest a 2 or greater (Mean= 3.43, Median= 4, Mode= 5, S.D.= 1.51). In the Work measure conditions, 78.7% of the participants rated their interest a 2 or greater (Mean=3.35, Median= 4, Mode= 4, S.D.=1.51).

Additional support for the applicant manipulation is found upon examining the means across Applicant and Honest conditions. Tables II through V demonstrate that the means were higher in the Applicant condition than in the Honest condition for all traits

(excluding Neuroticism in which lower scores would be expected and were found). This pattern was found for both General and Work groups (see Table IV).

### *Descriptive Statistics*

Data was initially visually screened for random responding. Data was screened for missing values and cases with more than one missing value per 12-item scale were omitted. Missing values were replaced with the individual's mean scale score on that particular trait to maintain trait consistency. Outliers were examined and data that fell more than 3.29 standard deviations outside the mean were omitted (26 cases were omitted for extreme scores).

Tables II and III contain the means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum scores for the General condition. Table IV and V contain the means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum scores for the Work FOR condition. Finally, Table VI and VII demonstrate the mean differences between Applicant and Honest conditions for both General and Work FOR groups respectively. For both groups the means are higher in the Applicant condition. The means are also higher for the Work condition than for the General condition (again excluding Neuroticism).

Tables VIII and IX include the reliabilities of both groups and conditions, as measured by Cronbach's alpha. For the General group, the Honest condition reliabilities ranged from .77- .86, excluding Openness where alpha= .58; and in the Applicant condition reliabilities ranged from .82- .89, again excluding Openness where alpha= .69. For the Work group, the Honest condition reliabilities ranged from .81- .89, excluding Openness where alpha= .61; and in

the Applicant condition reliabilities ranged from .81- .89, again excluding Openness where  $\alpha = .60$ .

Applicant faking was calculated by taking the difference between the applicant score and the honest score at the item level. Amount of faking, the variable created using the difference between applicant and honest conditions had a mean, ranged from -5.09 for Neuroticism to 6.01 for Conscientiousness, for the general condition (Table X), and ranged from -2.38 for Neuroticism to 3.47 for Conscientiousness for the work FOR condition. Skew and Kurtosis estimates for the indicators of the amount of faking are skew = 1.03, and kurtosis = 1.07. Reliability estimates for the amount of faking are presented in Table XII.

Hypothesis one tests the difference in the amount of applicant faking between general and work conditions. Multivariate analysis of variance was performed on 5 dependent variables and one independent variable. The dependent variables are amount of faking in NEO (neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness). The independent variable consisted of two different frame of reference conditions (general and work). These results should be viewed conservatively because the data failed to meet some of the statistical assumptions. Specifically, there is heterogeneity of variance-covariance matrices of the dependent variables as tested by the Box's Test of Equality of Covariance Matrices. There is also heterogeneity of error variance in neuroticism, extraversion, and openness dependent variables as measured by Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variance. This heterogeneity of variance is expected given the previous research on the use of FOR measures.

The Hotelling's Trace statistic was utilized as the omnibus test. The combined dependent variables were significantly affected by frame of reference conditions ( $F(5, 355) = 2.172, p = .05$ ). Based on the significant result, the impact of the main effect on the individual dependent variables was analyzed with separate one-way analysis of variance. There are significant differences between the frame-of-reference and all the dependent variables except openness to experience ( $F(1, 354) = 2.50, p > .05$ ) as shown in Table XIII. The general condition resulted in significantly more amounts of faking than the work condition in neuroticism ( $F(1, 354) = 8.76, p = .003$ ), extraversion ( $f(1, 354) = 8.06, p = .005$ ), agreeableness ( $f(1, 354) = 6.15, p = .014$ ), and conscientiousness ( $f(1, 354), p = .005$ ).

Hypothesis two was tested using a methodology suggested by Griffith et al. (2000). In order to identify which applicants faked their responses we calculated the probability that an individual would score within a confidence interval established around the subjects' score on the NEO-FFI constructs under the honest condition. Under normal variance conditions, an applicants' score should fall within this confidence interval with 95% certainty if no bias was present. Individuals who scored above the upper bound of this confidence interval were categorized as fakers. The confidence interval estimate was calculated by multiplying the standard error of measurement (SEM) for each of the 5 constructs by 1.96. An individual's true score should fall within this range 95% of the time. We then calculated a standardized effect size ( $d$ ) to examine the magnitude of faking in both the applicant and faking conditions.

Using this operationalization of applicant faking we conducted a chi square analysis to determine if the percentage of fakers in the general vs. FOR conditions statistically differed. The chi square results presented in Table XIV, partially support Hypotheses 2. There were significant differences for conscientiousness and agreeableness at the .05 level. While openness approached significance ( $p = .08$ ), neuroticism and extraversion were non-significant.

For hypothesis 3, the scores on the future and past versions of the SCS were analyzed for significant differences using an ANOVA. A significant difference was found between the future and past versions ( $F = 34.752$ ;  $p < .001$ ). The scores in the future condition also had higher mean ( $X = 5.88$ ;  $S.D. = 0.58$ ) than the scores on the past version of the SCS. The results support the hypothesis that responses in the future temporal context will be elevated, and significantly higher than in the past temporal context.

For hypothesis 4 the scores on the future and present versions of the SCS were also analyzed for significance using an ANOVA. A significant difference was found between the future and present scores on the SCS, and the analysis provided an  $F = 9.438$  ( $p < .001$ ). The mean calculated for the future version ( $X = 5.88$ ;  $S.D. = 0.58$ ) was higher than the mean calculated for the present version ( $X = 5.59$ ;  $S.D. = 0.67$ ). The results support the hypothesis and suggest that responses in the future temporal context will be elevated and significantly higher than the present temporal context.

Hypotheses 5-9 were tested using bivariate correlations (Tables XV and XVI). Descriptive statistics for all predictor measures can be found in Tables XVII and XVIII. Hypothesis 5 (a & b) stated that cognitive ability would predict the amount of applicant

faking in the general condition, but not in the work FOR. In the both conditions cognitive ability was not significantly correlated with the amount of applicant faking. Thus hypothesis 5a is not supported. While hypothesis 5b was technically supported caution should be used interpreting a supported null hypothesis given the pattern of correlations. Hypothesis 6 stated that integrity would be significantly negatively correlated to the amount of applicant faking. This hypothesis was supported for conscientiousness, but not for the other 4 constructs ( $r = -.19, p < .05$ ) in the general condition. Hypothesis was supported for all five constructs (Table XVI) in the work FOR condition. Hypothesis 7 was also supported in both the general and work FOR condition, suggesting that applicants with an external locus of control have higher amounts of applicant faking. Hypothesis 8 (IM will be positively correlated with the amount of faking) and Hypothesis 9 (SDE will be significantly positively correlated with amount of faking) were not supported, in fact for several constructs the correlation was opposite in sign that the predicted direction.

Additional analyses were conducted to determine if the effects of integrity and locus of control were additive, or if they interacted to predict even higher levels of applicant faking when both were present. We conducted a multiple regression analyses to examine this possibility. The amount of faking was used as the dependent variable, with integrity, locus of control, and the interaction term entered as independent variables in that order. In the general condition both variables were significant contributors to the model, but the interaction term was not significant. The same pattern was found in the work FOR condition. Thus, there is no interaction between integrity and locus of control.

## Discussion

The current study examined several factors that have been suggested by theoretical models to contribute to applicant faking. Our research suggests that external factors, such as situational variance, as well as internal factors including integrity and locus of control are related to applicant faking behavior. Several variables that have traditionally been associated with faking behavior, such as ability, SDE and IM, did not demonstrate predictive relationships.

Our results are a first step towards developing a comprehensive empirical model of applicant faking behavior. Our operation definition of faking behavior relies on the difference between a baseline true score and the observed applicant score on a personality scale. One goal of this research was to ignore previous conceptualizations of faking as a construct, and break down that difference score into possible components of faking behavior (Fig 2). While in no way conclusive our results indicate that there are several determinants.

The situation has a powerful influence on our day to day behavior, and is no less influential in an applicant setting. When we utilized a FOR condition to tease apart situational variance associated with faking we found that significantly less faking occurs in a work FOR condition. Given the recent findings regarding the increased reliability and validity of FOR measures, our results add additional weight to the argument that FOR measures are superior to general measures for the prediction of job performance. When we tested the hypotheses that temporal cognitive biases may have an impact on the elevation of personality scores, we found that future representations of the self tended to be more positive than past representations. This finding may also yield applied benefits and suggests that

bio-data type measures, which have a past FOR, may suffer less from the elevating effects of temporal cognitive biases.

We also tested several individual differences that have been suggested to influence faking behavior. Integrity was negatively related to the amount of applicant faking. However it was more consistently related in the work FOR condition. One possible explanation for this pattern of results is that in the general condition situational variance may be a stronger contributor, and its influence may mask that of integrity. In the work FOR the variance in the interpretation of the situation is reduced, and integrity is a more reliable predictor. Locus of control was also a significant predictor of faking behavior for both general and work FOR conditions. This result is not surprising given the constructs link to academic dishonesty. The employment testing situation is in many ways simply an extension of testing in school.

The constructs that have long associated with applicant faking, Self Deceptive Enhancement and Impression Management were not significantly positively correlated with faking, and in some instances were negatively correlated. While this seems counterintuitive, those constructs have been criticized as poor proxies for faking behavior in the past (Cristiansen, 1997). These finding further question their inclusion in a model of faking, and their use as “flags” for faking behavior.

In the current study, we used the respondent’s score obtained in an honest condition as the baseline score. Once participants had completed the measure under applicant conditions, where they actually believed they were applying for a job,

participants were debriefed and told that no job existed and that their responses were being used in a research study examining the use of employment tests. Data was then collected in an honest condition where respondents were instructed to answer as honestly as possible, that their responses would be numerically coded and all identifying information would be removed. Participants were also informed that the data would be used for research purposes only and that the researcher would be the only individual that had access to the data.

While ideally the true score would be the most desirable anchor point for our study, the honest condition provides us with a viable and attainable baseline measure to examine the amount of faking that occurred in a simulated applicant setting. Honest scores have been used as a baseline in many previous studies (Douglas, et al., 1996; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Mueller-Hanson, Heggstad, & Thornton, 2003; Smith & Ellingson, 2002). However this approach is not without criticism. One criticism is that even when instructed to be honest, respondents are incapable of fully complying with these instructions because of unconscious biases. One such bias that has been examined in the faking literature is Self Deceptive Enhancement (SDE), which is the tendency to give self-reports that are honest but positively biased (Paulhus, 1991). If honest scores are inflated by SDE, they may not provide an accurate baseline for the current study. However, our primary concern in applicant faking is not unconscious inflation of scores, but intentional distortion of personality information (Snell & McDaniel, 1998). Therefore if SDE is present in honest responses it will aid in isolating the effects of intentional distortion, not confound them. In addition the SDE influenced honest scores

would provide a conservative estimate of the amount of applicant faking since the honest scores would be higher than the “true” score.

Another criticism of the honest instructional set is that when participants are instructed to respond in an honest fashion after applying for a job, they may be more conservative in their own self reporting of personality traits. Asking them to answer honestly may imply that we are looking for dishonesty, and could cause the participants to self report lower levels of undesirable behaviors. Additionally participants may be angry after being debriefed, and not cooperate with the honest instructional set, providing inaccurate data. .

We calculated the difference scores for all cases on the focal measures by subtracting the individual’s applicant score from his/her honest score. The issue of using difference score variables has been criticized in past research. The criticisms are based on the assumptions that difference scores are meaningless and unreliable (Edwards, 1993). This criticism has evolved into a received doctrine that difference score variables should not be used in research. However, Rogosa, Brandt and Zimowski (1982) suggest that difference scores are not fundamentally unreliable and can be an accurate and useful measure of change. Difference scores can be used with confidence when scale reliabilities are high, the correlation between the original scales is low to moderate, and the variance of each test is considerable (Rogosa et al., 1982). McFarland and Ryan (2000) used this rationale to examine variance in faking non-cognitive measures.

#### *Future Research*

One of the motivating factors for untangling the antecedents of applicant faking behavior is to begin to understand their impact on the prediction of performance. Determining the job performance of individuals who have faked has been difficult, mostly due to the difficulties in identifying faking behavior. If faking is influenced by different factors, it stands to reason that fakers may vary significantly on job performance. Future research should examine this often argued, but as of yet untested question. Are fakers really poor performers? While this question can be answered using a combination of the current methodology and that used by Douglas et al.(1996), it may be best answered by using real organizations and real applicants.

While still contested, evidence is mounting that a significant number of applicants do fake in employment situations. However, one of these applicants is not like the other. Applicant faking may be influenced by a variety of factors that may be present in differing amounts for different applicants. By untangling these sources of faking variance we may gain a better understanding of the nature of the phenomenon, and determine the impact of faking on the quality of employment decisions.

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Table I  
Manipulation Check for Applicant Condition

<b>Survey Item</b>	<b>Percent YES</b>	<b>Percent NO</b>	<b>Not Appl</b>
Have you ever been dishonest on a job application before?	14.1	81.3	4.7
Do you feel more pressure to be dishonest on a job application when you really need the job?	37.5	56.3	6.3
Do you believe that often others are dishonest on job applications?	73.4	26.6	
Do you believe your personality at work is different than your personality outside of work?	46.9	53.1	
Do you believe your personality at school is different than your personality outside of school?	57.8	42.2	
Did you believe that you were applying for a real job during this experiment?	75.0	25.0	

Note: N= 64

Table II  
Descriptive Statistics for General Applicant NEO-FFI

<i>Measure</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
Neuroticism	214	13.00	50.00	26.92	8.38
Extraversion	214	24.00	60.00	44.93	6.89
Openness to Experience	214	26.00	54.00	41.34	6.12
Agreeableness	214	21.00	60.00	47.22	7.70
Conscientiousness	214	22.00	60.00	49.49	7.55

Table III  
Descriptive Statistics for General Honest NEO-FFI

<i>Measure</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
Neuroticism	228	12.00	56.00	32.43	8.81
Extraversion	228	19.00	60.00	40.69	7.53
Openness to Experience	228	19.00	57.00	39.11	6.00
Agreeableness	228	13.00	60.00	41.83	7.23
Conscientiousness	228	14.00	60.00	43.14	8.13

Table IV  
Descriptive Statistics for Work Applicant NEO-FFI

<i>Measure</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
Neuroticism	239	12.00	51.00	25.04	7.27
Extraversion	239	22.00	60.00	44.21	6.61
Openness to Experience	239	21.00	54.00	39.41	5.56
Agreeableness	239	26.00	60.00	49.00	6.91
Conscientiousness	239	23.00	60.00	50.69	7.11

Table V  
Descriptive Statistics for Work Honest NEO-FFI

<i>Measure</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
Neuroticism	239	13.00	55.00	28.28	8.22
Extraversion	239	16.00	60.00	41.85	7.58
Openness to Experience	239	20.00	54.00	38.46	6.21
Agreeableness	239	16.00	60.00	45.45	8.37
Conscientiousness	239	17.00	60.00	46.32	8.81

Table VI  
Descriptive Statistics for General Amount of Faking NEO-FFI

<i>Measure</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
Neuroticism	178	-34.00	23.00	-5.09	9.47
Extraversion	178	-24.00	24.00	4.13	7.82
Openness to Experience	178	-25.00	21.00	1.72	6.57
Agreeableness	178	-28.00	36.00	5.10	8.84
Conscientiousness	178	-27.00	39.00	6.01	8.76

Table VII  
Descriptive Statistics for Work Amount of Faking NEO-FFI

<i>Measure</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
Neuroticism	178	-39.00	24.00	-2.38	7.74
Extraversion	178	-21.00	38.00	1.96	6.58
Openness to Experience	178	-16.00	30.00	.71	5.35
Agreeableness	178	-20.00	29.00	2.82	8.55
Conscientiousness	178	-25.00	40.00	3.47	8.39

Table VIII  
Reliabilities for General NEO-FFI (Applicant and Honest conditions: respectively)

<i>Measure</i>	<b>GENERAL</b>	
	<b>Applicant</b>	<b>Honest</b>
<i>Conditions</i>	N = 214	N = 228
<i>Neuroticism</i>	.86	.86
<i>Extraversion</i>	.82	.81
<i>Openness</i>	.69	.57
<i>Agreeableness</i>	.85	.77
<i>Conscientiousness</i>	.89	.86

Note: Internal consistency measured by Cronbach's alpha

Table IX  
Reliabilities for Work FOR NEO-FFI (Applicant and Honest conditions: respectively)

<i>Measure</i>	<b>Work</b>	
	<b>Applicant</b>	<b>Honest</b>
<i>Conditions</i>	N = 239	N = 239
<i>Neuroticism</i>	.82	.85
<i>Extraversion</i>	.79	.81
<i>Openness</i>	.60	.61
<i>Agreeableness</i>	.83	.84
<i>Conscientiousness</i>	.89	.90

Note: Internal consistency measured by Cronbach's alpha

Table X  
Descriptive Statistics for General Amount of Faking NEO-FFI

<i>Measure</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
Neuroticism	178	-34.00	23.00	-5.09	9.47
Extraversion	178	-24.00	24.00	4.13	7.82
Openness to Experience	178	-25.00	21.00	1.72	6.57
Agreeableness	178	-28.00	36.00	5.10	8.84
Conscientiousness	178	-27.00	39.00	6.01	8.76

Table XI  
Descriptive Statistics for Work Amount of Faking NEO-FFI

<i>Measure</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
Neuroticism	178	-39.00	24.00	-2.38	7.74
Extraversion	178	-21.00	38.00	1.96	6.58
Openness to Experience	178	-16.00	30.00	.71	5.35
Agreeableness	178	-20.00	29.00	2.82	8.55
Conscientiousness	178	-25.00	40.00	3.47	8.39

Table XII  
Amount of Faking at Item Level Scale Reliabilities

<i>Big Five Personality Traits</i>	<i>General</i>	<i>Work</i>
Neuro	.83	.71
Extra	.77	.59
Openness	.59	.43
Agree	.82	.79
Consc	.84	.84

Table XIII  
Test of Analyses of Variance

Amount of Faking NEO	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Neuroticism	1	655.306	8.763	.003
	354	74.781		
	355			
Extraversion	1	420.699	8.055	.005
	354	52.231		
	355			
Openness	1	90.003	2.505	.114
	354	35.298		
	355			
Agreeableness	1	465.306	6.151	.014
	354	75.647		
	355			
Conscientiousness	1	576.430	7,834	.005
	354	73.583		
	355			

Table XIV  
Percentage of Fakers in General & Work FOR

<i>Big Five Personality Traits</i>	<i>General</i>	<i>Work</i>	<i>Pearson Chi-Square</i>	<i>Sig</i>
Neuro	3.37%	7.30%	1.84	.13
Extra	26.97%	22.47%	1.45	.14
Openness	22.47%	16.85%	2.37	.08
Agree	29.21%	19.10%	6.40	.01
Consc	34.27%	24.72%	2.95	.05



Table XV  
 Correlations between Amount of Faking NEO-FFI and predictor measures in General Condition

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
General Condition (N = 178)										
1. Amount of Faking NEO Neuroticism	-									
2. Amount of Faking NEO Extraversion	<b>-.629**</b>	-								
3. Amount of Faking NEO Openness	<b>-.298**</b>	<b>.356**</b>	-							
4. Amount of Faking NEO Agreeableness	<b>-.636**</b>	<b>.676**</b>	<b>.337**</b>	-						
5. Amount of Faking NEO Conscientiousness	<b>-.681**</b>	<b>.744**</b>	<b>.368**</b>	<b>.712**</b>	-					
6. Self-Deceptive Enhancement	<b>.291**</b>	-.071	.075	-.090	-.133	-				
7. Impression Management	<b>.201*</b>	-.053	-.056	-.122	-.116	<b>.411**</b>	-			
8. Integrity	.087	-.019	.032	-.124	<b>-.192*</b>	<b>.251**</b>	<b>.519**</b>	-		
9. Locus of Control	<b>-.197*</b>	<b>.164*</b>	-.049	<b>.248**</b>	<b>.291**</b>	<b>-.289**</b>	-.146	<b>-.255**</b>	-	
10. Ability (WPT)	.046	-.078	-.115	-.134	-.077	.039	.083	.054	-.050	-

Note; \*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

\* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

Table XV I  
Correlations between Amount of Faking NEO-FFI and predictor measures in Work Condition

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Work Condition (N = 178)										
1. Amount of Faking NEO Neuroticism	-									
2. Amount of Faking NEO Extraversion	<b>-.568**</b>	-								
3. Amount of Faking NEO Openness	<b>-.333**</b>	<b>.323**</b>	-							
4. Amount of Faking NEO Agreeableness	<b>-.563**</b>	<b>.610**</b>	<b>.277**</b>	-						
5. Amount of Faking NEO Conscientiousness	<b>-.611**</b>	<b>.608**</b>	<b>.351**</b>	<b>.746**</b>	-					
6. Self-Deceptive Enhancement	<b>.164*</b>	-.129	-.144	-.138	<b>-.269**</b>	-				
7. Impression Management	.072	-.119	-.122	-.134	<b>-.153*</b>	<b>.482**</b>	-			
8. Integrity	<b>.202**</b>	<b>-.179*</b>	<b>-.185*</b>	<b>-.227**</b>	<b>-.313**</b>	<b>.281**</b>	<b>.424**</b>	-		
9. Locus of Control	<b>-.267**</b>	<b>.200*</b>	<b>-.175*</b>	<b>.275**</b>	<b>.282**</b>	<b>-.268**</b>	<b>-.166*</b>	<b>-.297**</b>	-	
10. Ability (WPT)	.014	-.002	.022	-.132	-.100	<b>.204*</b>	.178	.021	<b>-.226*</b>	-

Note; \*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)  
 \* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

Table XVII  
Descriptive Statistics for General Predictor Measures

<i>Measure</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
Self-Deceptive Enhancement	158	38.00	79.77	61.32	7.14
Impression Management	160	25.57	88.08	57.06	10.75
Integrity	202	16.00	41.00	30.29	5.22
Locus of Control	157	30.00	89.00	63.77	9.77
Ability (WPT)	192	0.00	39.00	22.52	6.768

Table XVIII  
Descriptive Statistics for Work Predictor Measures

<i>Measure</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>
Self-Deceptive Enhancement	171	44.00	85.00	61.49	7.13
Impression Management	172	30.00	96.00	58.63	11.12
Integrity	237	16.00	42.00	30.79	5.14
Locus of Control	162	16.00	70.00	40.01	10.07
Ability (WPT)	168	0.00	43.00	22.36	7.08

Figure 1. Graphic of Applicant Faking




Figure 2. Influences on Applicant Faking

