Sample Cabinet Briefing Paper

Sample Cabinet Briefing Paper - 10/01/99

SUBJECT: U. S. Interests at Stake in Korea

In anticipation of serious high level discussions concerning the evolving situation in Korea since the change of government in the North, the Deputies Committee directed the Interagency Working Group to prepare a summary briefing paper for cabinet officers. This memorandum responds to that tasking.

Background

A high visibility humanitarian crisis has been developing in North Korea for several years.

Last year at this time things had begun to look up as a result of UN managed food and health programs and the decision by the US on September 17,1999 to ease sanctions and allow the importation of most North Korean-origin goods, permit most personal and commercial funds, and begin normal sea and air transport between North Korea and the US. By the end of November, this new regime had been abandoned due to the DPRK's decision to ignore their obligations under the arrangement regarding missile testing and nuclear weapons production.

Last March President Clinton sent General Powell and Senator Nunn as special emissaries to Pyongyang but weapons talks remained stalled. In June of this year, the US, Japan and the ROK suspended food shipments to North Korea pending the DPRK's cooperation on long stalled nuclear weapons talks. Starvation and unrest increased significantly during the next three months but there were few indications of impending political change.

On October 3, a group of senior civilian and military leaders arrested "Dear Leader" Kim Chong-il and ousted the government in North Korea. This change of power was accomplished with relatively little bloodshed, and the new government has announced dramatic changes in policy including the desire for political reunification of the peninsula on the ROK' 5 terms. Since the coup in Pyongyang, Kim Chong-il has been under house arrest and northern cities and the DMZ has been relatively quiet.

The ROK views this situation as an opportunity to be seized and has begun talks with the DPRK. President Kim Dae-jung called President Clinton asking for his help in making unification a reality. The President told President Kim that the US would consult closely with the ROK and provide extensive support while taking a low-key public role.

Major Considerations

The Interagency Working Group on North Korea has identified these elements of the present situation that should shape US policy vis-a-vis the Korean peninsula:

· The USG security position in North East Asia is based upon the security relationship with the ROK, including the stationing of sizeable US military forces in South Korea.

· The North Korean government possesses a nuclear program, which poses some threat to our allies in the region, if not ourselves.

· The continued democratic and market economy oriented development of the ROK is a high priority.

· Developments on the Korean Peninsula have been introduced into the US electoral campaign.

· Japan and China in particular are very sensitive to developments in Korea.

· Political reunification of Korea is probably inevitable at some point.

· The current governments of North and South Korea appear to be committed to early reunification and are likely to expect the withdrawal of US military forces from peninsula as part of the deal.

Priority Interests

Given these considerations, the Interagency Working Group on North Korea is operating on the assumption that it is in the interest of the US - in order of priority -- to:

1) retain the best possible US military posture in the Pacific theater,

2) preserve the US/Japan security arrangement,

3) neutralize the DPRK' 5 nuclear weapons potential,

4) minimize human suffering in North Korea,

5) preserve a democratic ROK,

6) facilitate unification of the Korean peninsula by appropriate means if it is consummated on acceptable terms,

7) improve relations with China and the rest of the region, and

8) support a constructive role for the UN as a way to strengthen that institutional capability for the future.

Sample Political-Military Implementation - 10/01/99

1.0 INTRODUCTION AND ASSESSMENTS

1.1 Overview

This Political-Military Implementation Plan (pol-mil plan) addressing the situation in North Korea (hereinafter "Korea 2000") was prepared in response to the National Security Advisor's memorandum of October 19, 2000. By that memorandum he established an Executive Committee (ExCom) pursuant to Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-56 in accordance with the recommendation of the National Security Council's Deputies Committee (NSC DC), chaired by a senior member of his staff, to manage the US response to the situation in North Korea. In the same memorandum, he directed the preexisting Interagency Working Group on North Korea (IWG-NK) to support the ExCom by preparing a Political-Military Implementation Plan (pol-mil plan) as called for by PDD-56.

The ExCom for North Korea will rehearse Sections 1 - 4 of "Korea 2000" for the first time on October 27 and, when acceptable, forward the partial document to the NSC Deputies Committee for review and approval. When NSC Deputies Committee approves Sections 1 - 4 of a pol-mil plan to meet the situation in North Korea, it will be returned to the ExCom and the IWG-NK and/or the affected government departments and agencies for preparation of the documents that constitute Section 5 of the pol-mil plan.

1.2 Assessment of Situation

The situation in Korea is tense and it is potentially explosive at least in the near-term. Because of the uncertainty concerning the status of some special weapons units in the North, there is the remote possibility of rogue military action. In North Korea, there has been no repetition of the recent effort by the hardliners to seize power and Kim Chong-il remains in custody. ROK intelligence and government contacts, our best source of information, believe that the IGC will retain power in Pyongyang.

Since hard-line opponents of the Interim Governing Council (IGC) in North Korea attempted a coup on October 19, 2000, the international community has been very active in an effort to stabilize the situation. With UN Security Council Resolution 1234 (UNSC Res 1234) of October 23, 2000, the international community has, at the request of the IGC and the ROK, assumed a facilitative role with respect to political changes on the peninsula. This mandate is in addition to the humanitarian relief role that the UN agencies have played for several years. The essential elements of a Revision of the 2000 UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for DPRK (Revised 2000 CA) were released on October 24, 2000.

Because of the impending US presidential elections, planning is being conducted in an Immediate Phase (covering the period prior to the inauguration of the new President) and a Second Phase covering the remainder of fiscal year (FY) 2001.

Note: There are at least two other broad political outcomes possible in present circumstances - a return to pre-October 2000 hostilities and a continued separate, but less troublesome, North Korea unable to come to terms with the South. Either of these results would negate the utility of this pol-mil plan. No effort is made herein to deal with these contingencies.

2.0 INTERESTS AND MISSION

2.1 Assessment of US Interests at Stake and Capabilities

2.1.1 Interests - It is the interest of the US - in order of priority - to:

a) protect US personnel from the possibility of rogue special weapons attack,

b) retain the best possible US security posture in the Pacific theater,

c) preserve the US/Japan security arrangement,

d) neutralize the DPRK' 5 nuclear weapons potential,

e) minimize human suffering in North Korea,

f) preserve a democratic and market oriented ROK,

g) facilitate unification of the Korean peninsula by appropriate means if it is consummated on acceptable terms,

h) improve relations with China and the rest of the region, and

i) support a constructive role for the UN as a way to strengthen that institutional capability for the future

2.1.2 Capabilities - The US has several capabilities that could be brought to bear on this problem, including:

a) the US military in South Korea and the region with significant humanitarian as well as military capability,

b) AID/OFDA and other agencies with readily deployable humanitarian relief assets,

c) DOE and DOD deployable technical assets to assist in the special weapons protection and management,

d) substantial financial assets and extensive influence with international financial institutions,

e) a strong bilateral relationship with the ROK with experience in joint operations,

f) good working relationships and significant influence with Japan, regional organizations, and the UN,

g) major influence with many NGOs that could contribute to the situation, and

h) a sizable Korean American population in that can contribute significantly.

2.2 Mission Statement

To facilitate appropriate political change on the Korean peninsula while protecting US personnel and the US security posture in the Pacific, neutralizing the DPKR nuclear threat, relieving human suffering and supporting institutional development in a unified Korea, in two phases:

2.2.1 Immediate Phase (November 2000 - January 2001) - take necessary steps to:

a) protect US personnel from rogue special weapons attack,

b) insure that the ROK receives full support in its effort to bring about reunification on acceptable terms,

c) support efforts to secure North Korean nuclear weapons potential,

d) facilitate UN political role to effect unification agreement, and

e) support the UN effort to relieve human suffering through the provision of additional quantities of food stocks and health related commodities.

2.2.2 Second Phase (February 2001 - September 2001) - subject to validation by the next administration:

a) continue Immediate Phase actions,

b) support institutional development in a united Korea - if proceeding/concluded on an acceptable basis - to include implementing US military redeployments, and

c) encourage/facilitate international organizations, other governments and NGOs to assist with the transition.

2.3 Objectives

US objectives, assuming that events on the peninsula continue to unfold in a positive fashion, are:

2.3.1 Immediate Phase (November 2000 - January 2001) - to:

a) protect US personnel from rogue special weapons attack

b) maximize the US contribution to ongoing UN sponsored feeding and health programs in North Korea,

c) keep a low public profile concerning US intentions in order to permit the parties and the SRSG/UNPBSO to have the maximum opportunity to achieve a unification agreement,

d) provide effective behind4he-scenes support to ROK efforts to negotiate a unified Korea on acceptable terms, and

e) if necessary, take the lead in securing effective International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) managed safeguards over all North Korean nuclear weapons potential.

2.3.2 Second Phase (February 2001 - September 2001) - upon validation by the next administration implement actions to:

a) continue programs initiated during the Immediate Phase plus

b) provide economic support to a unified Korea via a 1) multilateral economic assistance program aimed at the transition (or bilaterally in the absence of a multilateral effort) to a unified Korea and 2) financial support through international financial institutions,

c) plan, negotiate and begin implementation of appropriate adjustments to the US military stationing in the Pacific, and

d) solicit the involvement of international organizations, other governments and NGOs in the transition process.

2.4 Desired Pol-Mil Endstate

Save for relief from hunger and health in North Korea, the desired pol-mil endstate depends on the absence of violence directed at US personnel and progress in the ongoing talks about political unification on the Korean peninsula

-- a process that the US cannot control and must evaluate over time. Tentative endstate criteria, organized by the phases of this plan, are:

2.4.1-- Immediate Phase (November 2000 - January 2001) - N/A

2.4.2-- Second Phase (February 2001 - September 2001) - subject to confirmation bv the new administration, a satisfactory unification agreement between the ROK and DPRK negotiated and successfully implemented would result in the implementation of the second phase programs outlined above, the initiation of formal planning for US military redeployment and the initiation of associated negotiations with other governments (if appropriate), and automatic termination of this plan at the end of FY 2001. Conversely, should negotiations toward unification breakdown definitively, this pol-mil plan will be declared OBE by the ExCom.

2.5 Transition/Exit Criteria

This section is only applicable to a situation where the Second Phase conditions have been achieved. As stated in Section 1.1 above, other political outcomes negate the utility of this pol-mil plan.

If an acceptable political unification settlement is achieved, and as relatively few US personnel are likely to be deployed specifically as a function of this pol-mil plan; formal transition/exit criteria are not needed. Decisions about the reduction of US military forces in the ROK and their relocation -- when such a plan becomes appropriate -- are matters that should be finalized by the next administration after the political situation on the Korean peninsula takes shape.

If all goes well, it is the US intention that the UNSC will terminate the SRSG, the UNPBSO, and the UNC at an appropriate time in the future - probably well after this pol-mil plan is applicable i.e., after October 1, 2001. However, as the formal end of a special UN role in Korea will have a significant impact on security arrangements with Japan as well, this step is not part of this plan.

3.0 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

3.1 Overall Concept of Operations

Until we are confident that the threat of serious violence has subsided - to include the potential for a rogue special weapons event -- the US will focus primarily on protecting its citizens and continuing it's traditional role of backing up the ROK should they face an attack form the North. After that, we will operate in a multilateral and bilateral context to assist the political transition that is expected to take place on the peninsula. The US strategy is to enhance our long-term position in Asia by facilitating positive change in a low-key fashion thus improving our chances of making satisfactory arrangements for our military forces in future.

Nelson Mandela (South Africa) has been appointed as Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) to head a Peace Building Support Office (UNPBSO) that, in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1234, will "assist political consultations between the DPRK and the ROK and will harmonize and integrate the activities of the UN system on the Korean Peninsula during the transitional period leading up to the conclusion of relevant political and military consultations and the current humanitarian crisis...."

UNSC 1234 also calls for the deployment of 100 military observers "to assist in the disengagement of military forces" and for a delegation from the International Atomic Energy Agency "to assist with registration and management of nuclear facilities if requested by the DPRK." The UNSC has also agreed to consider the deployment of a peacekeeping force of up to 2,500 to assist with implementation after a military disengagement plan is worked out. In addition, the essential elements of a Revised 2000 CA for the DPRK have been released. In this context the US intends to:

a) support UNSC Res 1234 to the fullest extent possible,

b) assist the ROK (to include a new unified government) on a bilateral basis to insure success - economic assistance and financial support,

c) make a maximum effort to relieve hunger and improve health conditions in the North, and

d) encourage maximum participation by international organizations, other governments and NGOs.

However, US military personnel will not be deployed into North Korea and we will adopt a low-key public posture leaving the initiative to the SRSG and the ROK.

One aspect of the DPRK' 5 plan for achieving unification, announced immediately after the IGC seized power and before the more recent failed counter coup, calls for military forces along the DMZ to pull back to show the good intentions on each side. While the ROK may choose to participate in this demonstration, US forces will not be shifted until such time as a final agreement on unification - acceptable to the US - has been achieved and substantially implemented. This aspect of policy should be made public after appropriate consultation with the ROK and congressional leaders.

These active US projects are approved:

3.1.1 Immediate Phase (November 2000 - January 2001) - Plan and:

a) deploy specialized (CBR) assets as needed to protect US personnel,

b) contribute additional food to WFP to enable it to meet new goals established by the UN's Revised Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal (Revised CA) for the DPKR,

c) if other nations do not come through quickly, contribute additional resources to health and coordination targets established by Revised CA for DPKR,

d) from US existing stocks, deliver emergency food and health supplies to ROK for delivery to DPRK military and families as symbolic gesture to relieve suffering,

e) augment US embassy Seoul with additional assets to assist with support of SRSG/UNPBSO,

f) prepare FY 2000 supplemental request to cover all (including Second Phase programs) additional Korea costs, except for US military redeployments, for submission with FY 2001 budget,

g) reprogram funds as necessary to provide any services associated with this situation requested by the UN,

h) make equipment and staff available to the UN as requested,

i) conduct consultations with IOs, other governments and NGOs to secure a maximum multilateral effort, and

j) publicize the situation within the US to secure financial support from the public, especially the Korean-American community

3.1.2 Second Phase (February 2001 - September 2001) - Subject to validation bv the next administration:

a) as necessary, continue Immediate Phase programs,

b) prepare, and justify to the congress, a FY 2001 bilateral economic assistance program for execution if a unification settlement, acceptable to the US, is consummated,

c) if a multilateral economic support program to assist a unified Korea develops, participate fully in the effort in lieu of a bilateral program,

d) encourage an international financial program to assist a unified Korea to cover to cover absorption costs,

e) if a unification settlement acceptable to the US is consummated, and

f) negotiate and execute a US military redeployment from Korea.

Additional projects are likely to be approved as the situation in Korea unfolds.

3.2 Lead US Agency Responsibilities

3.2.1 State - primary agency for:

a) Coordinating and communicating policy concerning unification to ROK, DPRK, the UN, other governments, and UNPBSO;

b) reprogramming 10 funds to meet UNPBSO support requests,

c) public spokesman concerning policy aspects of this plan, and

d) congressional consultations in all areas except for questions about redeployment of US military forces.

3.2.2 Defense - primary agency for:

a) emergency food/health package from US stocks provided via ROK armed forces,

b) communication with ROK and international military,

c) assisting State with public affairs policy generally,

d) assisting State with security related aspects of negotiations aimed at political unification,

e) primary spokesman about US military redeployments,

f) protecting US personnel in Korea from potential of rouge special weapons threat,

g) assisting DOE with US assistance to IAEA to secure North Korean nuclear capability, and

h) assisting international military personnel as requested south of the DMZ,

3.2.3 Justice - primary agency for:

a) dealing with domestic legal implications of transition to unified Korea, and

b) advising the new Korean government on law enforcement matters.

3.2.4 Treasury - primary agency for:

a) organizing an international financial support program to assist a newly unified with the transition, and

b) amending foreign asset control regulations to reflect a new political situation on the Korean peninsula.

3.2.5 Energy - primary agency for:

a) assisting the IABA as necessary to secure North Korean nuclear assets, and

b) assisting in the case of a rogue nuclear weapons situation.

3.2.6 AID - primary agency for:

a) assessing the humanitarian crisis in North Korea,

b) advise/assist DOD on preparation of emergency food/health package from US stocks,

c) development of economic assistance package for implementation if satisfactory unification agreement is achieved,

d) arrange for US support of the Revised 2000 CA food and health commodities program, and

e) encouraging NGOs to make maximum effort.

3.2.7 0MB - primary agency for:

a) assembling a FY 2001 supplemental for all aspects of the Korea program for inclusion with the FY 2002 budget by the current Administration,

b) preparation of FY 2002 budget amendments and any additional FY 2001 supplementals related to the Second Phase of the pol-mil plan if approved by the new administration - to be sent to the Hill as part of the traditional amendment/supplemental/recission package submitted in February or March by new a Administrations adjusting the previous President's budget program, and

c) assembling omnibus legislative proposal to remove the various restrictions on trade and other activities with respect to the DPRK for submission to the Congress by the new administration after a satisfactory unification agreement has been achieved.

3.2.8 CIA - primary agency for:

a) assessing the political situation in North Korea, and

b) assessing the impact of events in Korea on the political situation elsewhere with emphasis on potential options for repositioning US military forces in the region.

3.3 US Government Organization

3.3.1 Washington Interagency Elements - once a pol-mil plan is adopted by the Deputies Committee and higher authority, operations with respect to the Immediate Phase of the plan will be conducted under the continuing guidance of the ExCom on North Korea. The IWG on North Korea will continue to provide staff support to the ExCom. Washington organizational arrangements for the Second Phase of the pol-mil plan will be subject to review bv the new Administration.

Regular agency staff relationships with the UN will be used to process support requests associated with this situation.

3.3.2 US Organization/Command Relations in theater - in keeping with our low key, behind the scenes approach to the unification question, the US Ambassador in Seoul will be responsible for US support of UNPBSO operations on the Korean peninsula and for representing US policy on unification to ROK, DPRK, and UNPBSO officials. All US government civilian agencies on the peninsula will report through the Chief of Mission (Ambassador) in Seoul as will the small DOD office established to assist with negotiation of security aspects of a unification agreement.

In addition, in the Second Phase, CINCPAC will establish a small Joint Task Force to handle DOD support for the transition and follow-on planning for US redeployment. This unit will report in the same fashion as the present Commander, USFK.

3.4 UN Organization in theater

The SRSGIUNPBSO (Nelson Mandela), by the terms of UNSC Res 1234, will coordinate all UN activities in Korea including:

a) facilitation of the negotiations concerning political unification of the ROK and DPRK,

b) the existing relief program consisting mainly of NGOs that is currently coordinated by a designated Humanitarian Coordinator from the UN,

c) the work of a new group of 100 Military Observers,

d) activities of a delegation from the IABA, and

e) the actions of a Peacekeeping Force of up to 2,500 persons (if later approved by the UNSC).

In addition, UNSC Res 1234 directs that there should be close cooperation between the SRSG/UNPBSO and the UN Command (UNC) in South Korea, especially with respect to the military elements, and that the UNC should support the SRSG/UNPBSO generally.

4.0 PREPARATORY TASKS

4.1 Diplomatic Strategy

The campaign to support US objectives should begin immediately and concentrate on encouraging support for the ROK and the UN in their pursuit of political unification and the other provisions of UNSC Res 1234. State will conduct a diplomatic initiative composed of three elements:

a) bilateral contacts with relevant countries,

b) a public stance designed to reassure the leaders in Pyongyang, and

c) a public diplomacy effort designed both to reassure the publics of the two Koreas and other concerned countries and to encourage their support of their governments' constructive participation in the Korea situation.

The diplomatic effort should concentrate in the first instance on Korea's immediate neighbors - Japan, China, and Russia - and then on the other countries of Asia. The bilateral contacts required to pursue this strategy should include an intensive effort among member state delegations in New York.

4.2 Funding Issues and Authorities

All Immediate Phase activities will be initiated with extant appropriations. FY 2001 supplemental requirements associated with Korea will be submitted to OMB in time for inclusion with the FY 2002 budget materials. Adjustments to FY 2002 budget requests now being reviewed will not be entertained favorably. Budget amendments for FY 2002, if necessary, will be submitted by the next administration as will any authorization changes that are deemed necessary.

4.3 Congressional Strategy

ExCom members have kept key congressional officials abreast of the situation and Administration policy and planning process, however, nothing should be sent to the Hill in writing prior to adoption of the pol-mil plan. Upon approval, State - supported by other agencies as appropriate -- should begin formal briefings the leadership and key committee staff on the status of events in Korea and approved Immediate Phase plans by the US immediately after the elections in early November. Briefings about the Second Phase of the pol-mil plan will be deferred until the review by the new Administration and a congressional strategy is adopted.

4.4 Public Affairs and PSYOPs Strategy

Consistent with the objective of facilitating the ability of the UN and the Korean parties to work out an agreement on unification, State, with active support from DOD, should launch public diplomacy program with the objective of fostering support for the reunification process among the publics of the various countries concerned.

Of primary concern during the Immediate Phase is the attitude and cooperation of the people of North Korea, but the South Korean population must not be ignored despite their enthusiasm for unification. The German example is instructive and some public affairs/PSYOPS effort should be devoted to reassuring the two publics that unification is in their best interest, long as well as short term. A special focus on North Korean military is indicated.

A parallel effort should be launched to support the diplomatic campaign to encourage public support in other countries in the region -- especially China, Japan, and Russia - that have the most reason for concern from unification in the long term. Specifically, we want to maintain public support in these countries for their governments' political and financial support of the political changes in Korea.

4.5 Logistics

DOD should expedite the emergency food/health from US stocks to the North via the ROK military.

State/DOD should be prepared to expedite UN support requests

4.6 Intelligence

Constant monitoring for indications of regional government attitudes and intentions with respect to political unification on the Korean peninsula should continue with high priority.

4.7 Legal Authority

No issues have been identified so far. State and DOJ will continue to review this area for possible statutory changes that may be required for submission by the next administration.

5.0 Functional Element/Agency Plans - To be prepared after above approved