No-DICE Group Handout #1

No-DICE Group Handout #1

1200 - 10/13/99 actual

Your Situation

On October 5, 2000 an interagency working group was established by the NSC Deputies Committee to monitor developments in North Korea. You have been assigned to help represent your department/agency in this interagency group. It is now October 13, 2000 and the fourth session of the interagency group has just begun. The interagency committee has decided to meet in three functional groups -- diplomatic, security, and economic -- today in order to focus on the diverse issues raised by the situation in North Korea. Edward Marks-State, who also chairs the whole interagency working group is in charge of the diplomatic functional group, John Eisenhour-OSD leads the security functional group, and Ron Bearse-Treasury heads the economic functional group.

Recent Scenario Events

On September 30, the commander of a North Korean battalion stationed along the DMZ contacted the Republic of Korea (ROK) unit opposite his command and arranged for the immediate defection of his entire unit. On October 1, one of the Korean People's Army Corps commanders at the front communicated to ROK Army contacts his willingness to work with South Korean forces claiming that "our country is being destroyed and together, perhaps, we can avert total catastrophe." Also on the 1st, US intelligence noted reports of street fighting in several North Korean cities and in the city of Hamhumg, more than 300 people were reportedly killed or injured when a local commander ordered his troops to fire on a large but peaceful demonstration of citizens. The use of military forces in this incident proved to be the catalyst for the coup by the reform faction within the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

The long feared and often predicted internal collapse of the government of the DPRK occurred on October 3, and has raised a number of serious political, economic, and military questions on the Korean Peninsula. As predicted in 1998 by Hwang Jang Yop, a former member of the top North Korean policy-making council, the Communist regime was toppled by its most trusted institution -- the military

Moving with surprising speed, senior military leaders and trusted members of the political bureaucracy ousted "Dear Leader" Kim Chong-il. They disbanded the Supreme People's Assembly, outlawed political activity by the Korean Workers' Party and proclaimed their desire to reunite with the South. The senior military, who are calling themselves the Interim Governing Council (IGC), justified their coup by citing the failure of the political leadership to resolve critical national policy issues, including balancing the need for economic improvements against the demand for maintaining political stability and national security. In moving swiftly to assume power, the leaders of the Ministry of People's Armed Forces have faced the ever-growing threat of a "total implosion" of their economy and the bankruptcy of their political system.

Although not a complete surprise to international observers, the timing and the manner of the event is not yet fully understood by outsiders. Tensions between the north and the south -- and the US-- have steadily escalated since mid-November of 1999, when stories leaked to the American news media about the existence of yet another North Korean secret nuclear weapons facility. It was also suggested that Pyongyang was deploying Taepo-dong missiles capable of reaching Hawaii and Alaska.

This was an exceptionally irritating event because on September 17, 1999 the Clinton Administration had announced that it was easing sanctions against the DPRK. In a process that was formally terminated on November 30, 1999, the plan -- according to the White House press release -- was to ease restrictions over several months on:

§ “The importation of most North Korean-origin goods and raw materials;

§ “The export and re-export of most non-sensitive goods and services of US companies and their foreign subsidiaries, such as most consumer goods, most financial services, non-sensitive inputs for investment in non-sensitive industrial sectors;

§ “Investment in such sectors as agriculture, mining, petroleum, timber, cement, transportation, infrastructure (roads, ports, airports), travel/tourism;

§ “Remittances from US nationals to North Korean;

§ “The transport of approved (i.e., non-sensitive) cargo to and from North Korea by commercial US ships and aircraft, subject to normal regulatory requirements;

§ “Commercial flights between the US and North Korea, subject to normal regulatory requirements."

These aborted changes were intended to prevent further missile testing and nuclear weapons production, but, the DPRK's decision to ignore their obligations under the new US policy in late October,1999 resulted in a return to the pre-September 17, 1999 sanctions.

In March of this year, President Clinton sent retired General Cohn Powell and former Senator Sam Nurin as special emissaries to Pyongyang but talks stalled. In June, food aid from the United States, Japan, and South Korea was suspended temporarily by the three countries pending progress in the weapons talks. Subsequently, many private aid groups began to withdraw from North Korea. Meanwhile, the North Korean government intensified its rhetoric all through the spring and summer.

It now clear that a powerful military-civilian faction within the leadership decided that the country was too poor and too hungry to keep up the contest with the South and the pursuit of its Communist era policies. Therefore, they apparently chose to undertake the enormous gamble of offering peaceful reunification with the South as a means of beginning to fix the serious economic, security, and infrastructure problems which have plagued the country in the 1 990s.

The interests of the United States, Japan, China, Russia, and the Republic of Korea all intersect on the Korean peninsula. Dramatic change in the government of the North has long been considered -- by all parties -- as having the potential of disrupting peace and stability in Northeast Asia as well as on the Korean peninsula itself. Of immediate concern is the possibility of widespread civil war, massive refugee flows, a nuclear incident, and of an incident involving US and South Korean troops along the DMZ.

In the slightly longer term there is no clear consensus about how a reunification process might take place. Although contingency plans exist for some aspects of gradual unification, the suddenness with which this potential reality has emerged has caught South Korean (and American) planners somewhat flatfooted. Congressional interest is very high, and the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has announced that he will schedule hearings on the Korean reunification in the next couple of weeks even though the Congress has already adjourned for the election.

Since the coup on October 3, several significant events have taken place in the security arena. On the 7th, the new regime in Pyongyang proposed immediate reunification with the South, agreeing to accept in principal all of the previously stated conditions. There were only two DPRK requirements: there must be a firm commitment and program for a total withdrawal of US military forces from the peninsula, and a firm commitment and program for the removal of the DMZ minefields.

The North followed that offer by stating that it would begin immediately to reposition its own front line units away from the DMZ to demonstrate its intentions. US and ROK intelligence agencies report preliminary signs that this redeployment is underway. CINCPAC's assessment of the current military balance on the peninsula, however, is that little has changed in terms of the military capabilities of the DPRK forces.

The US, Japan, and the ROK authorized resumption of food shipments to North Korea on October 10 but, no other concrete steps have been taken as of October 13, 2000.

Background

Political

President Kim Il-song's sudden death in July 1994 place the responsibility for continued political stability in the hands of his son, Kim Chong-il, who became the "supreme leader" of the country, controlling the party, and indirectly the government and armed forces. By the fifth anniversary of his death in July 1999, the cult of personality around Kim Il-song had reached huge proportions. In fact, in 1998 the elder Kim was renamed president and is now referred to as "eternal president" rather than "president for life" as his former title no longer fits. The system which Kim Chong-il inherited has not changed significantly since the beginning of his father's regime, with the highly centralized Korean Workers' Party continuing to make policy, while the government executed and administered those policies.

Faced with enormous economic problems, the new leader permitted the conclusion of the October 1994 "Agreed Framework" in which North Korea agreed to freeze and dismantle two graphite moderated reactors that would be capable of producing weapons-grade plutonium in exchange for a variety of benefits from the US, Japan, and South Korea. The payoff included two light-water nuclear power reactors for generating electricity, 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil annually, security assurances, and the promise of improved relations with the United States.

Despite the hope of this agreement, relations sputtered on and mistrust was rife on both sides. In 1998, even as US diplomats were at the UN speaking about Pyongyang' s suspected nuclear site, North Korea, as part of its 50th anniversary celebrations on August 31, sent a three-stage missile soaring over Japan. Although it remained unrepentant, Pyongyang later consented to further negotiations about the suspected site in exchange for additional food shipments.

The disarray in the North became ever more apparent during the last years of the decade, as the slow trickle of defectors became a steady stream of top level administrators and regional governors, all telling the same story of government corruption, malfeasance, and incompetence. The outcome was that by the end of 1999, widespread disenchantment with the system was apparent and instability began to surface in both urban and well as rural regions.

Intelligence reports indicated that a serious power struggle was underway, with essentially two factions contending for power. Pyongyang radio announced in mid-June that "plotters and schemers" had been identified in the aftermath of failed succession plans who had "attempted to usurp the Dear Leader's leadership rights". Two factions became identifiable, one dedicated to maintaining the hard line ideology, and the other more inclined to reconcile with the South and bring the regime into the mainstream of global intercourse.

Because of Pyongyang' s extreme secrecy, the true strength of the factions could not be clearly determined until the coup of October 3 of this year. It is also unclear as to the possible role of China in this development, or even, as of today, China's position on the change of regime.

Since then, the victorious reformist faction, with support from many but not all of the demoralized military, has attempted to move rapidly to end the country's international isolation. It immediately requested expanded emergency assistance from the World Food Program and other UN assistance bodies, and notified the UN (including the World Bank and the IMF) that it would be asking for longer term assistance in bringing their economic structure into line with the "free market" economies of the region. It almost immediately requested consultations concerning entering into the international non~proliferation regime and has publicly stated its interest in resuming reunification talks with the South and normal relations with the United States, Japan, and China.

Internally, the new regime has granted amnesty to all political prisoners and has stated publicly its intention to implement wide-ranging political and social changes. In communications to Seoul, the new government has expressed a desire to move quickly to change the military standoff with the ROK and the US. Specifically they wish to change the location and disposition of military units on both sides of the DMZ.

Despite these encouraging signs, hard-liners remain. Some of the remaining discredited hard-line leaders have expressed outrage at these declarations and statements and are demanding that the new national leadership renounce these proposed reforms and go back to the "true road of Chucha to win the imminent life and death struggle with the American imperialists and their puppets." ROK and US intelligence agencies report that hard-line elements are trying to rally support within the military for a counter-coup.

The new reformist government officials have told the ROK that law and order has broken down in many areas of the country and that the police are having difficulty in preventing the widespread movement of internal refugees. Military discipline has broken down in many units, and there of unconfirmed reports of "renegade" military units which are still undecided about their support for the new government. Control over the conventional military and nuclear weapons capability is unclear at this time, and the reform military leaders are trying to clarify the status. The outbreak of civil war remains a possibility.

Economic

Since its very beginning, North Korea's economy has been hobbled by the country's heavy defense spending, low productivity, and lack of managerial expertise. The economic downturn that began in the late 1980's has continued unabated. The country has suffered a catastrophic annual grain shortage of about 1.5 million tons - roughly a third of consumption -- since 1995. The dramatic reduction in support from China, the former Soviet Union, and Socialist-bloc countries in Eastern Europe in the early 1 990s is part of the problem. Severe shortages of crude oil, food, raw materials and electric power impede industrial and agricultural productivity and the country is increasing unable to pay international debts. The standard of living has nose-dived. Compared with those from five or ten years ago, satellite photos taken recently showed the lights going out in North Korea. The economy has nearly ground to a halt.

Agriculture remains labor intensive while heavy industry, including arms production, has been emphasized at the expense of consumer goods. Foreign assistance played an important role in the overall trade balance despite the North's avowed philosophy of self-reliance. Relying heavily on the importation of fuels, cooking oil, and coking coal, Pyongyang became every more dependent on the large sse of the international community to provide for shortages, especially basic foodstuffs.

Six years after the "Agreed Framework" North Korea has not opened up to the world, apart from extending its tin cup, has not substantially reformed its economy, and has used what dwindling resources it has to develop two new generations of ballistic missiles. Meanwhile it had become the largest recipient of US aid in Asia (mostly food aid). Nevertheless, food shortages increased, health conditions declined significantly, and social instability -- including large numbers of internally displaced persons -- resulted. Even with humanitarian assistance from the international community, the deteriorating situation apparently caused the leaders of the reform faction to decide that the time had come to face reality.

Humanitarian Affairs

The combination of drought and tsunami damage to coastal rice growing areas decimated North Korea's grain production for the fourth year in a row. Empty Public Distribution System food stores encouraged hungry rural dwellers to swarm into the cities. World Food Program officials, NGOs, and foreign news reporters who have been allowed in to previously forbidden areas report that there are clear signs of malnutrition and starvation on a wide scale. Corpses are lying beside railroad tracks indicating that people who have fallen from the trains have been left to perish. Second echelon troops from the KPA and police are among those who are visibly emaciated. Outside observers report large numbers of children and infants dying from starvation in hospitals and clinics throughout the North. More recent reports confirm that parents are discarding their newborns because they do not have the means to provide for them.

The number of internally displaced persons is unknown but clearly growing. Most are migrating towards the cities although there are reports of some movement towards and across the Chinese border, with obvious implications for public health as well as public security and political stability. There are no reports yet of any refugee movement towards the DMZ.

The WFP-led humanitarian assistance program has been in operation for several years, although severely restricted by DPRK constraints. The old regime's restrictions are expected to be lifted, but the atrophied WFP-NGO structure inside North Korean and the financial and food resources previously made available by the international community will be inadequate.

Health/Sanitation

WFPINGO reports from all parts of North Korea claim that hospitals and clinics are operating without basic medicines, including anesthesia for operations. Supplies of drugs are non-existent and inoculations for children have been halted for want of vaccines. Outbreaks of cholera and typhoid have been reported in Harnhung and Pyongyang.

Attachments

No-DICE Group Handout #2

1300 - 10/13/99 actual

Your Situation

On October 5, 2000, an interagency working group was established by the NSC Deputies Committee to monitor developments in North Korea. You have been assigned to help represent your department/agency in this interagency group. On October 15, the heads of sever~ departments requested short papers (3 pages max) outlining the key elements of the situation with respect to Korea and US interests at stake in order of priority. It is now October 18, 2000 and the fifth meeting of the interagency group is in session to complete these documents by COB today. The interagency group decided to meet as functional groups to prepare these "night reading" papers. Edward Marks-State, who also chairs the whole interagency working group is in charge of the diplomatic functional group, John Eisenhour-OSD leads the security functional group, and Ron Bearse-Treasury heads the economic functional group.

Recent Scenario Events

The internal situation in North Korea remains highly unstable since the original coup of October 3, 2000. "Dear Leader" Kim Chong-il is reported to be in protective custody and as such is a potential rallying point for those who lost power in the coup. The new government - calling itself the Interim Governing Council -- almost immediately announced that it was preparing a comprehensive program of reform intended to reverse many previous policies, and reintegrate North Korea into the global economy by means of reunification with South Korea. The new regime went so far as to accept the principal of reunification on the conditions set out by the ROK, and to make unilateral moves towards military disengagement.

Unfortunately, the combination of imminent economic and social collapse and continued opposition by hard-liners in the government and in the military services has frustrated the new government from making much progress in its declared program. Nevertheless, as recently as October 14, Pyongyang sent a message to Seoul, via military channels, which reiterated the reform program but stated that the new government needed rapid and concrete responses from the ROK and other interested governments if civil war in the North was to be avoided.

The October 14 message specifically cited the rapidly deteriorating food supply situation, which continues to hover at the edge of famine for significant parts of the population. ROK intelligence sources report food riots in several provincial cities, and attempts by hard-line Party officials to turn the riots into an anti-government movement. In several locations, North Korean military personnel reportedly participated in the riots. The most recent World Food Program (WFP) report, dated October 13, estimates that upwards of 20 percent of the population (50% of children) face death by starvation within the next two months.

As a result of the food shortages, and the continuing political instability, the number of internal refugees is growing rapidly. A UNHCR report dated October 13 substantiated by ROK intelligence, that the movement from the famine stricken countryside towards the cities is threatening minimal public security and health standards in those cities, that numbers of refugees are crossing into China, and that others are beginning to probe the DMZ.

The US/ROK Combined Forces Command headquarters in South Korea reported yesterday that several mines on the northern edge of the DMZ were apparently set off by small refugee groups attempting to cross into South Korea. Although the reports indicate that refugees were the likely cause of the explosions, both US and ROK forces were moved to a higher state of readiness for several hours.

Over the past days, the reformist government has made a formal approach directly to the United Nations via its Permanent Mission in New York, and has sent special missions to Seoul and BeUing on October 15. The delegation which went to Seoul asked the ROK to pass on its message to the US, and also requested an official meeting with US representatives in Seoul as soon as possible.

The basic message, at least to Seoul, Washington, and New York, from the IGC is that the success of the reformist initiative lies in the balance and immediate and massive assistance --humanitarian, economic, financial, military, and political -- is needed immediately. If not, civil war in the North, producing threats to the stability of neighboring countries and the region is almost certain. The time frame for this eventuality is estimated -- by the government in Pyongyang -- to be in terms of weeks. On October 14, the President of the ROK called President Clinton to pass along the Pyongyang's concerns and to suggest a joint ROK-US assistance program.

There are indications that the North Korean situation may become a last minute domestic political issue as the campaign for President reaches a fever pitch. Speaking in Chicago on October 14, the Republican candidate suggested that the chaos in North today was the direct result of bungling by the Clinton White House earlier this year. In his view, the suspension of food aid last June to stimulate the stalled weapons talks was a reckless act that endangered US troops in South Korea. The Republican candidate has also said that the White House was being too timid in terms of support for the new government in Pyongyang. So far, the White House has chosen not to respond to these allegations.

UN officials are frantically trying to put together an expanded short-term humanitarian assistance program for North Korea. They hope to have a draft ready soon and will announce a special donor's meeting for October 21 or 22. The Secretary General has informed members of the Security Council that he is planning to call a special meeting of the Security Council to discuss the Korean situation within the next week.

The US Ambassador in Beijing was called in by the Prime Minister on October 9 to discuss the

Korean situation. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Defense officials have been querying

US officials for our view of the Korean situation for the past week

Yesterday, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs took our Ambassador aside after the conclusion of the visit of the high-level trade delegation to discuss the situation. He repeated that the Japanese government is very concerned about the implications for regional security if a civil war should break out in the North. He indicated that the Japanese Government would be prepared to open its coffers to help with the situation, preferably as part of an UN-led operation. The Minister and the Ambassador agreed to meet early next week for a more formal review of the situation and of theoptions open to their respective governments.

Attachments

No-DICE Group Handout #3

1300 - 10/20/99 actual

Your Situation

On October 5, 2000 an inter-agency working group was established by the NSC Deputies Committee to monitor developments in North Korea. You were assigned to help represent your department/agency in this interagency group. On October 19, 2000 the NSC Deputies Committee established an EXCOM pursuant to PDD - 56 to deal with the situation in North Korea. That EXCOM met last night and the National Security Advisor has tasked the interagency working group with drafting a political-military plan. It is now October 20, 2000 and the sixth session of the interagency working group is now in plenary session. Edward Marks-State is in the chair.

Recent Scenario Events

Late on the afternoon of October 19 there was an attempted counter-coup against the reformist IGC in Pyongyang by hard liners in the army. There was serious fighting into the morning hours and, according to fragmentary reports, at a number of army camps throughout the country. The number dead and wounded run into the low thousands in the capital alone.

For the moment, the reformist IGC has survived and regained control in Pyongyang, but the counter-coup leaders and a significant number of their supporters remain at liberty, armed, and dangerous. Kim Chong-il, it is reliably reported, remains in the hands of the IGC.

The counter-coup was launched by army units brought into the capital and assisted by numbers of individual former government and party officials who are not reconciled to the new regime and its program of reunification with the South. The Navy was apparently not involved, nor any Air Force units but it is unclear if that abstention of the Air Force was out of loyalty to the new regime or because the attempted coup had no role for them. None of the units responsible for North Korea's military nuclear program appear to have been involved, but military officials supporting the reformist regime have expressed concern about this matter to ROK counterparts.

While some arrests were made, the leaders of the counter-coup were not captured although some were reportedly killed in the fighting. The rest of the hard-line dissident leaders have retreated to the bases of several army units, which support them, or are in hiding in the capital.

The attempted counter-coup was preceded by several days of increasing unrest in the cities and in the countryside as the food supply situation worsens, and the number of refugees seeking security as well as food increases. Chinese border troops have been reportedly attempting to turn back a growing flood of refugees along the Chinese - Korean border; shots have been fired in both directions and there have been casualties.

More dangerous for the US is that small groups of refugees have been attempting to cross the minefields in the DMZ into South Korea. Several have been wounded and killed. This situation is exacerbated by the behavior of North Korean soldiers on the DMZ. In several places, they have attempted to open direct contact with the UN forces opposite and work out transit arrangements for refugees.

On at least two occasions, however, North Korean soldiers have fired on UN troops attempting to assist North Korean refugees caught in the minefields. One of these incidents produced casualties among South Korean troops (one dead, four wounded.) Pyongyang repeated its request for quick action on its request for some form of disengagement and demining in the DMZ.

Public interest in Korea has picked up dramatically. The regular press briefings by the State and Defense spokesmen on October 19 were dominated by questions about the overnight reports from Asia. Speculation centers on possible involvement of US forces in rumored ROK plans to save the reformist government in the North.

The US intelligence community estimate of the situation in the North after the counter coup attempt of October 19 (dated October 20), is quite favorable from the standpoint of the reformist government. While the situation is not clear, there is no indication that the IGC has been ousted. What is not known, is whether or not yesterday's events will cause any moderation in the announced intentions by Pyongyang to pursue redeployment and unification quickly. Concessions to the hard-liners may instead be the order of the day.

The UN Secretary-General has submitted a report on the situation in Korea and requested a

Security Council meeting for 10:00 am, October21. The US Mission to the UN reports that the

Chinese are preparing a proposal which would authorize a UN humanitarian and diplomatic

mission with a mandate covering both Koreas and specifically the military situation in the DMZ.

Washington issued instructions to USUN concerning the upcoming UNSC discussions.

Attachments

No-DICE Group Handout #4

1400 - 10/20/99 actual

Your Situation

On October 5, 2000, an inter-agency working group was established by the NSC Deputies Committee to monitor developments in North Korea. You were assigned to help represent your department/agency in this interagency group. On October 19, 2000 the NSC Deputies Committee established an EXCOM pursuant to PDD - 56 to deal with the situation and the National Security Advisor tasked the interagency working group with drafting a political-military plan. The EXCOM, in turn, provided the interagency working group with policy guidance on October 21. It is now October 25, 2000 and the seventh session of the interagency group is meeting in plenary session to wrap up the political - military plan by COB today. The EXCOM rehearsal is Wednesday, 10/27/00. Edward Marks-State is in the chair.

Recent Scenario Events

The situation in North Korea remains tense and unstable. There are intelligence reports that the hard-liners are regrouping for another attempt at overthrowing the reformist IGC, appealing to an increasing frightened and hungry population. The reformist government has repeated its appeal to the world community, especially the ROK, the US, and the UN, for immediate and massive assistance. There are no more food reserves in the country, according to the North Korean government and UN sources.

The UN Security Council approved a resolution on October 23, authorizing a special humanitarian operation and good offices mission for Korea. The SYG immediately appointed Nelson Mandela as his Special Representative and Martti Athisaari of Finland as his Deputy Special Representative, with the mandate to mediate a reunification agreement between the two Koreas. In pursuance of the UNSC resolution, and in response to the North Korean plea for humanitarian assistance, the UN Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance in New York released last night, October 24, the partial text of a revision of the 2000 United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for the DPKR. This document will be finalized by October 28, 2000.

The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a warning order to initiate formal planning in joint military channels on October 21. Also, in an interview early today, Secretary of State Albright outlined some important Clinton Administration intentions concerning the recent UN actions.

Attachments